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219

WESTERN EUROPE REVIEW

6 September 1978

CONTENTS

25X1

Recent meetings held by the Communists and Christian Democrats seem to indicate that cooperation will continue between the two parties, but both sides have been careful to preserve their option to break this off should a clear conflict on issues develop.

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79100912A001600010001-1 SECRET
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West Berlin: The Status of the Narcotics Black Market
Practical and political obstacles rooted in the special status of Berlin make it unlikely that effective and comprehensive controls over the smuggling of narcotics into the city will be developed.

25X1

Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

Italy: The Summer Maneuvers

Italy's two major parties, the Communists and the Christian Democrats, held meetings in late July to review party strategy after one of the most turbulent social and political periods in recent memory—the January—March government crisis, the abduction and murder of Aldo Moro, the resignation of President Leone, and the subsequent election of Sandro Pertini as Leone's successor. In a sense, these two party meetings marked an end to this turbulence and could also serve as harbingers of a contentious and uncertain autumn.

The Communist Meeting

The mood at the Communists' Central Committee meeting was sober. Party Secretary Berlinguer made a special point--somewhat defensively--of emphasizing that the Communist Party had finally overcome the forces within the Christian Democratic Party opposed to the formation of a governmental majority including the Communist Party. Berlinguer went on to admit that there is still a strong element within the Christian Democratic Party opposed to Communist participation in government, and indeed, that the entire Christian Democratic Party is still resistant to real economic and social renewal or a reduction of its power in government. Berlinguer nevertheless restated his basic policy; to remain within the majority and to demand full and rapid implementation of the agreed program.

Berlinguer acknowledged the Communist defeat in the 20 May local elections, but noted that most of the voting took place in the south, an area where the Communist Party historically has not done well, and was conditioned by sympathy for the Christian Democrats after the death of Aldo Moro. He admitted, somewhat plaintively, that the Communist Party had intentionally refrained from criticizing the Andreotti government during the Moro crisis in the interest of national unity; the Christian

6 September 1978

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Democrats had then taken the opportunity to conduct a "slanderous and provocative" election campaign against the Communists. Berlinguer said the Communists had failed to explain properly the content and implications of their social and economic austerity programs, while rival parties and trade unions have not been candid about the problems raised by the need for austerity programs. He called for redoubled efforts within parliament and outside to make sure that the government attacks these problems.

While Berlinguer's speech was critical of the legislative performance of the Christian Democrats, nonetheless, he reaffirmed support for Communist participation in the present majority government. He concluded by calling for a revitalization of Communist Party identity and a new commitment to alerting the electorate to the severe problems facing Italy and the need for quick implementation of austerity programs.

The Christian Democratic Meeting

The meeting of the National Council of the Christian Democrats was highlighted by the election of Flaminio Piccoli as Moro's successor to the party presidency and the address of Benigno Zaccagnini to the Council. Zaccagnini's address and Piccoli's comments after his election indicate that the Christian Democrats will continue to work with the Communists in parliament. Although the Christian Democrats were encouraged by the regional election results of 20 May, they are as yet unwilling either to risk an alliance with the Socialists or alienate the Communists to the point of having them withdraw from the government.

In his speech to the National Council, Zaccagnini began by saying that he did not regard the current working relationship with the Communist Party as definitive, terming it necessary because of Italy's political and economic situation but also exceptional and transitional. The majority government formed between the Communists and the Christian Democrats earlier this year did not, in the Secretary's opinion, represent a final solution for the Christian Democratic Party. He proceeded to note the

6 September 1978

12

recent electoral gains of the Socialist Party under the leadership of Bettino Craxi. Before the National Council meeting some conservative Christian Democrats, including Defense Minister Ruffini, had called for a revival of the alliance between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, thus eliminating the need for Communist support within parliament.

Zaccagnini's speech revealed that the majority of the leadership within the Christian Democratic Party is still wary of the new-found strength of the Socialists, especially the autonomous line advocated by Socialist leader Craxi. Zaccagnini and his followers have interpreted the Socialist idea of autonomy to mean that Craxi wants to increase the electoral strength of his party at the expense of both the Communists and the Christian Democrats. It is inconceivable to Zaccagnini that the Socialists would be willing to return to the government as part of the majority unless the Communist Party was also included, in spite of the recent Socialist rhetoric decrying Communist Party positions and policies.

According to Zaccagnini, the Christian Democrats and the Communists will continue to engage in active and spirited debate in the coming months. While he may not be happy with the prospect of continued cooperation with the Communists, Zaccagnini saw no prospect of a return to the time that saw the Communists in the opposition.

Recent comments by Christian Democratic Party Chairman Flaminio Piccoli reinforced Zaccagnini's statements, stressing Christian Democratic and Communist cooperation. Piccoli has been well known in the past as a leader of a faction of the Christian Democratic Party that resisted the efforts of the late Aldo Moro and his "historic compromise" with the Communist Party.

Piccoli's remarks since being elected chairman reveal a considerable change of tone on Christian Democratic and Communist cooperation in parliament. In an interview on 22 August, he noted that for the first time since 1947 there is a working relationship between the two major parties; he praised the efforts of Aldo Moro in forming a constructive relationship between the Christian Democrats and the Communists.

6 September 1978

Outlook

In the coming months, the Christian Democrats and the Communists will continue to work together in parliament, although there are elements within both parties that would prefer an end to this relationship. The Communists will press for social and economic programs that they believe must be dealt with by the Andreotti government. Berlinguer has clearly identified economic austerity as necessary for the preservation of Italian democratic government, and stated in a recent interview that he is willing to go into the opposition if the Christian Democrats fail to take action.

The Christian Democrats, on the other hand, do not see their relationship with the Communists as necessarily permanent or stable, but consider it at present more workable and plausible than an alliance with the reemerging Socialist Party. The defensive mood of both major parties has increased the probability of increased parliamentary confrontation, with the very real possibility that the Communists may return to the opposition if they believe the Andreotti government is acting in bad faith or is too insensitive to issues that need immediate attention. But as yet this return to opposition remains a vague threat, unsupported by a clear conflict on issues.

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6 September 1978

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West Berlin: The Status of the Narcotics Black Market

Practical and political obstacles to effective customs controls serve to protect West Berlin as a market for narcotics to the extent that it is now replacing Amsterdam as the "drug capital of Europe." These obstacles are rooted in the special status of Berlin, most firmly in the West German and Western Allied refusal to treat the boundaries of West Berlin as international borders. There is currently no prospect that an effective and comprehensive control over the smuggling of narcotics into the city will be developed.

The East Germans have in the past treated the Berlin drug problem as purely Western, and the laxity of their controls over foreigners, especially Turks, who enter West Berlin via the East German Schoenefeld airport near the city is advantageous to smugglers. Recently the East Germans have hinted at a willingness to cooperate more in controlling international narcotics movements. The practical results of this, however, are not predictable. Furthermore, the portion of the narcotics supply for the illicit West Berlin market that comes through Schoenefeld airport is estimated at only 20 percent.

More public focus on Berlin's narcotics problem, especially as it affects the US forces there, can be anticipated this fall, when a Congressional committee looking into drug abuse among US military personnel plans to hold public hearings in West Berlin.


Berlin as Narcotics Center

Recognition that West Berlin's rate of drug abuse is serious and rising dates from late 1977, when the West Berlin Government declared the narcotics "epidemic" to be the greatest danger to the city, surpassing even terrorism. The West German Minister of Health proclaimed West Berlin the center of West Germany's drug problem and stated that Turkish workers were supplying the addicts.

6 September 1978

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PRINCIPAL ACCESS ROUTES TO WEST BERLIN



The number of deaths from drug overdoses in West Berlin-rising since 1970-reached 87 in 1977, up from 54 in the previous year. The 1977 figure is much higher than the total of such deaths in the West German cities of Hamburg (16), Munich (16), Hannover (8), and Stuttgart (5). The West Berlin figure is said to represent a mortality of about 20 per thousand addicts.

Although West German officials a year ago believed that West Berlin was not yet supplying West Germany with substantial quantities of heroin, they feared such a development because the street price in West Berlin was lower and heroin was more easily and more safely obtainable. In the first quarter of 1978, the West Berlin police and customs seized more than five times as much heroin and arrested over three times as many persons on drug charges as during the same period last year. There was a decline, however, in the number of deaths from drug overdoses to 25 in the first five months of 1978.

The special status of Berlin impedes West German efforts to come to grips with the city's narcotic problem. Coordination of drug law enforcement in West Germany is done by the Permanent Working Group on Narcotics, in which West Berlin is not represented. Although there is cooperation with Berlin police on criminal cases, West German officials are well aware that no federal law enforcement agency has jurisdiction in West Berlin. The special status of the city, furthermore, prevents its government from erecting customs barriers against narcotics smuggling activity at the many entry points to West Berlin.

Holes in the Wall

West Berlin is an island that depends on its links to the outside world. Its interest is to facilitate access to the city and to minimize controls through which visitors must pass. Any new obstacle to passage in or out of West Berlin is seen as deepening the division of Germany and strengthening the East German claim to separateness.

The Western Allies insist, along with the West German and West Berlin Governments, that the boundaries of

6 September 1978

17

West Berlin are not an international border. This is a fundamental political and legal position. It applies with special force to the East-West Berlin boundary that runs through the middle of the city. Thus political objections to additional customs controls are formidable. So are the practical problems such controls would face, because there are many holes in the Wall where experienced travelers can enter West Berlin without undergoing more than routine identification. For example, after passing through East German controls -- which are cursory, especially for exiting foreigners -- in the main East Berlin railroad station on Friedrichstrasse, travelers can then board one of several subway or rapid transit lines and step off at any one of hundreds of stations in West Berlin without further encounters with controls. great resources would be required to apply a customs barrier on this system in the area under Western jurisdiction.

The problems of customs control on the western periphery of the city are equally staggering. The main entry points are highways that carry both international vehicular traffic and a very large volume of transit traffic between West Berlin and West Germany. After years of negotiation, the delays at these important entry points have been reduced to an acceptable minimum. To apply on the West Berlin side anything more than occasional customs inspections would entail delays and arouse political reactions. As many as a thousand trucks a day supply West Berlin with over half of its goods and materials: the thorough inspection of a trailer truck takes four or five hours.

Allied and Soviet Reservations

The French and the British share some of the US concern over the problem of drug abuse in West Berlin and have expressed a desire to be helpful, as long as damage is not done to important Western political interests. They are especially determined to maintain the position that the East-West Berlin line is not an international border. The French and British recently joined the US in approving a request by the West Berlin Senator for Interior for increased authority to control persons using the rapid transit lines run by East Germany in West Berlin. This action has so far resulted only in reopening

6 September 1978

18

a dormant dispute between the Western Allies and the Soviets, who usually feel compelled to back the East German claim to sovereignty over railroad property it owns in West Berlin. The Western Allies must insist that East German property in West Berlin is subject to their jurisdiction and control.

The political sensitivity of this issue assures that the additional authority granted the West Berlin police will be limited. Controls are to be occasional. They are not to be carried out on a large scale or close to the East-West Berlin line unless Western Allied permission is obtained beforehand. The prospect that these measures will decrease supplies to the West Berlin illicit narcotics market is small.

Turkish Connection

The assertion of Bonn's Minister of Health that Turkish workers supply the addicts and that West Berlin is the center of the drug problem, while perhaps oversimplified, reflected German understanding of developments since 1976. In that year, a joint West German - Dutch crackdown on traffic in "brown" heroin from Southeast Asia through Amsterdam effectively ended that product's dominance of the West German illicit drug market. The void has been filled by "white" heroin from the Middle East, which is also the source of hashish and cannabis.

25X1

These traffickers, hidden in the large Turkish immigrant communities of West Germany and West Berlin, are in a relatively strong position, and West German authorities expect the predominance of Middle East heroin on the market to continue. West Germany has over a million Turkish workers, thousands of whom vacation in Turkey each year and hundreds of whom then return bearing small (1 to 3 kilograms) amounts of heroin for distribution in West Germany. This pattern also appears in West Berlin.

The colony of Turkish workers in West Berlin numbers about 75,000, and there are an estimated 5,000 illegal Turkish residents as well. The sources of heroin for

6 September 1978

the West Berlin market are, typically, individual Turks selling small quantities. They travel to and from Turkey mainly by air or by vehicle. Of the latter, many, if not most, drive vehicles with West Berlin or West German tags, so that determination of who comes from Turkey in the heavy transit traffic to West Berlin requires time for a thorough passport examination. Air travelers can choose between the western route that passes through West Germany or the eastern route that uses the East German airport at Schoenefeld.

West Berlin authorities state that much of the heroin reaching the city from Turkey and the Middle East seems to pass through West Germany and that the couriers are indistinguishable from legitimate travelers. It is estimated that about 80 percent reaches West Berlin via the western route, especially in trucks, while only about 20 percent comes through Schoenefeld.

East Germany's Role

The East German regime tends to identify crime with capitalism and has strong political views about jurisdictional proprieties in the Berlin area. Both impede the regime's readiness to act against traffic in illicit drugs entering West Berlin. When a Bonn Health Ministry official raised the West Berlin narcotics problem with his East German colleague in late 1977, the latter expressed "astonishment" that a West German would presume to speak officially on a "purely Berlin matter." At about the same time, the Governing Mayor of West Berlin sent the East German Government a letter proposing cooperation in combating drug abuse, to which no answer has so far been reported.

Nonetheless, it is too early to write off the possibility that East Germany will be more helpful on the drug

6 September 1978

25X1

abuse problem. On 24 August, a Foreign Ministry official in East Berlin told the US Embassy that his government would like to receive the names of suspected couriers of narcotics. The offer of such information had been made six months earlier. Furthermore, there are factors that should argue for more East German cooperation. They include evident concern of the regime about the number of foreigners, especially Turks from West Berlin, who have been coming to East Berlin in search of an evening's entertainment. Inevitably they encounter the disenchanted youth of East Germany, and the potential for an expansion of the drug market is there.

Perhaps a more promising lever is the desperate East German need for hard currency, which could be somewhat alleviated by pay for services in an agreed East-West program to control drug abuse. Should the East Germans display an inclination to cooperate, West Berlin interest would presumably focus on the desirability of more stringent controls at Schoenefeld airport, or at the Friedrichstrasse railroad station and the southern crossing point on Waltersdorfer Chaussee used by buses from Schoenefeld to West Berlin. These two places are the logical chokepoints for control of travelers from the airport. Effective controls could have a perceptible impact on the illicit narcotics supply, but only on the estimated 20 percent that comes by the eastern route.

Outlook

There are signs, according to the US Mission in West Berlin and the US Embassy in East Berlin, that East Germany may gradually seek to project a more responsible image by displaying interest in international cooperation against narcotics traffickers. This is conceivable, but it is unlikely that cooperation would come about before the question of hard currency payment is addressed.

In weighing the benefits of such cooperation, the East Germans will be influenced by their assessment of the effect on the drug situation in East Berlin. Their ideological refusal to admit the existence of a drug problem, however, means there is almost no information on which to base an assessment of this factor.

6 September 1978

The West Berlin market in illicit drugs seems more dependent on Middle Eastern, notably Turkish supply than that of West Germany, where recent heroin seizures indicate that the Southeast Asian suppliers are back in business. A control program focused on the Turkish community of West Berlin, however, would be politically unacceptable.

Partial measures that could reduce the narcotics supply are possible. New controls at Waltersdorfer Chaussee, which handles limited traffic, largely of foreigners, would not greatly disturb Berlin political sensitivities. Such measures, however, offer only limited improvements. Special controls on passengers from Schoenefeld at Waltersdorfer Chaussee and Freidrichstrasse railroad station would, in time, drive smugglers to make use of other crossing points along the Wall, specifically Checkpoint Charlie. This would pose new political problems.

Any new control program comprehensive enough to bring about a major and lasting reduction of the traffic in narcotics to West Berlin risks blocking traffic in a manner that would irritate the Berliners. It also could not be brought into force without extensive inter-Allied coordination.

West Berlin's drug abuse problem will be highlighted by Congressional committee hearings now planned there in November. Although focused on the problem of US forces, the hearings will arouse public concern about drug abuse in West Berlin. Whatever might be stimulated thereby resolve to deal with the problem will not be forceful enough to override the local and international political considerations that militate against a comprehensive program. The French and British have insisted that there is no noticeable drug impact on their military forces in West Berlin. And the Berliners by history and experience are conditioned to resent all forms of control.

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6 September 1978

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